

**AS LILY LLC, Appellant,**  
**v.**  
**HAROLD L. MORGAN and PHYLLIS MORGAN; WACHOVIA BANK;**  
**NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; BAYWAY ISLES HOMEOWNERS CLUB, INC.;**  
**MICHAEL W. WELLS and KATHERINE A. WELLS; CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA);**  
**NATIONAL ASSOCIATION f/k/a CAPITAL ONE BANK; NORTHSTAR BANK, Appellees.**  
**Case No. 2D14-863**  
**DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT**  
**May 8, 2015**

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE  
REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED,  
DETERMINED

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County;  
Pamela A.M. Campbell, Judge.

Stanford R. Solomon and J. Andrew Baldwin of The  
Solomon Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Russell L. Cheatham, III, of Russell L. Cheatham, III,  
P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellees Harold Morgan  
and Phyllis Morgan.

No appearance by remaining Appellees.

CRENSHAW, Judge.

In this foreclosure case, the circuit court entered  
a final judgment of dismissal in favor of the  
homeowners, Harold and Phyllis Morgan. But  
because the bank, AS Lily LLC, was a proper party  
and had standing, we reverse.

As relevant here, the Morgans executed an  
adjustable rate note and mortgage in favor of Option  
One Mortgage in 2006. Attached to the note was an  
allonge with a blank endorsement. After the Morgans'  
subsequent default, the note was assigned to  
Liquidation Properties, Inc. (LPI). LPI initiated this  
foreclosure proceeding in 2008 and filed a copy of  
the mortgage and included a lost note count. Then, in  
2012, the circuit court granted AS Lily's motion to  
amend the complaint<sup>1</sup> and AS Lily filed the Verified  
First Amended Complaint at issue here. With its  
complaint, it attached the adjustable rate note, the  
mortgage, and the allonge with the blank  
endorsement. After a bench trial, the court granted a  
final judgment in favor of the Morgans, and AS Lily  
timely appealed.

The court granted judgment in favor of the  
Morgans largely based on its conclusion that AS Lily  
was not a proper party and that it lacked standing.

A plaintiff who is not the original  
lender may establish standing to  
foreclose a mortgage loan by  
submitting a note with a blank or  
special endorsement, an assignment  
of the note, or an affidavit  
otherwise proving the plaintiff's  
status as the holder of the note. . . .  
[S]tanding must be established as  
of the time of filing the foreclosure  
complaint.

Focht v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 So. 3d 308,  
310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (citing McLean v. JP  
Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173  
(Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

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AS Lily was not the original lender in this case.  
But by the time the verified first amended complaint  
to foreclose the mortgage was filed, AS Lily was the  
holder of the note and mortgage. AS Lily established  
standing by "submitting a note with a blank . . .  
endorsement." See id. Regardless of the note's prior  
history, the operative complaint was in AS Lily's  
name and AS Lily held the note with the blank  
endorsement. That is sufficient for standing. See  
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Morcom, 125 So. 3d 320,  
322 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing Mortg. Elec.  
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153  
(Fla. 2d DCA 2007)), review denied, 139 So. 3d 299  
(Fla. 2014)). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

Though ultimately ruling against AS Lily on  
standing, the court allowed AS Lily to try to establish  
the default. The court sustained an objection to  
testimony from AS Lily's witness, a representative of  
Gregory Lending, that the servicer's testimony was  
hearsay that was not admissible as a business record.  
See §§ 90.802, .803(6), Fla. Stat. (2011).<sup>2</sup> In reaching  
its decision the court erred in following Glarum v.  
LaSalle Bank National Ass'n, 83 So. 3d 780, 782  
(Fla. 4th DCA 2011). While we take no issue with  
Glarum, the facts of this case better track those in

WAMCO XXVIII, Ltd. v. Integrated Electronic Environments, Inc., 903 So. 2d 230, 233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In this case, the witness was testifying to information she personally knew and relayed what she herself did in establishing the values in this case. In Glarum, the witness could only provide inadmissible hearsay because he was testifying to material he obtained from another servicer and he was unfamiliar with how any of the data entries were made, either at the servicer for whom he worked or the servicer on whose data he relied. 83 So. 3d at 782. In WAMCO, the witness testified to procedures the servicer for whom he worked used and testified about his personal experience in servicing the loans at issue. 903 So. 2d at 233. Because in this case the bank's witness testified to procedures the servicer for whom she worked used in some detail and also testified about her personal experience with these loans in particular, the evidence sought to be adduced could be admitted as a business record. See id. (citing § 90.803(6)). Thus, the court erred in concluding that the witness's testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and it should have admitted the evidence.

Because the court erred in concluding that AS Lily was not a proper party, lacked standing, and that

its witness's testimony was inadmissible, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

ALTENBERND and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.

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Footnotes:

<sup>1</sup> The motion is not in our record, but the order on the motion is.

<sup>2</sup> We note that as far as authentication is concerned, the note and allonge here are self-authenticating, and the servicer's representative's inability to authenticate them is immaterial in this case. See § 90.902(8); Bryson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 75 So. 3d 783, 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

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